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The Continuing Saga of Environmental Cleanup
Costs: Current Deduction Allowed Under the
Restoration Principle of Plainfield-Union
We realize that we only have the land on loan, and that
we must look after it properly.'

"It has been estimated that by the end of the century, the
costs associated with the cleanup of the environment will
approach $160 billion per year."2 Such substantial expenditures will have serious economic effects on corporate America,
the U.S. government, and ultimately on every individual
residing in this country.
The deductibility of expenditures associated with the
cleanup of hazardous waste has not been specifically addressed
by the federal courts3 or Congress. Absent judicial or
legislative guidance, the Internal Revenue S e ~ c ehas
struggled to determine whether costs associated with
environmental cleanup activities are deductible as business
expenses in the year incurred: or alternatively, if these costs
are to be capitalized under 5 263 of the Internal Revenue
Code.5 Two conflicting policies are involved: (1) promoting
voluntary environmental cleanup activities; and (2) formulating
a tax revenue plan that will alleviate, if not eliminate, the five

1. Harlan S. Byrne, Heidemij: A Global Mr. Clean, BARRON'S,Sept. 5, 1994,
a t 18 (quoting Heidemij's 1993 annual report).
2. Paul L. Langer, Significant Current Developments in Environmental
INSURANCE COVERAGECLAIMS AND
Insurance Coverage, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION1994, a t 129, 129 (PLI Comm. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 690, 1994).
3. The two most relevant cases are Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Comm'r,
39 T.C. 333 (1962) (addressing the deductibility of costs associated with cleaning
and lining a water pipe with cement), and INDOPCO, Inc., v. Comm'r, 503 U.S.
79, 87-89 (1992) (holding that expenditures that benefit future periods must be
capitalized).
4. See I.R.C. 4 162 (1994). A deduction allowed in the year the expense was
incurred is referred to as a "current deduction" throughout this comment.
5. I.R.C. 9 263 (1994).
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trillion dollar national debt? Grappling with these policy
issues, the Internal Revenue Service ("the Service") has
recently issued three pronouncements that convey mixed
result^.^ The two most recent pronouncements8 adopt the
"restoration principle" that was advanced by the Tax Court
over thirty years ago: but which had largely been ignored by
the Service in previous pronouncement^.'^
The purpose of this comment is to explore the current
position of the Internal Revenue Service regarding the
deductibility of environmental cleanup costs and to propose a
strategy which balances the complex policy issues involved in
capitalizing or deducting environmental cleanup costs. Part I1
discusses statutory and regulatory authority that govern the
availability of a current business deduction. An illustration in
Part I1 depicts the tax benefit obtained by receiving a current
deduction of an expenditure under 5 162 rather than
capitalizing the expenditure under 5 263. Part I11 examines
judicial and administrative interpretations of the statutes and
regulations and portrays the difficulties the Service has
encountered in developing a consistent environmental cleanup
6. As will be discussed in Part IVYallowing a tax incentive to encourage
voluntary environmental cleanup will reduce tax revenue. However, if no incentive
is given and no cleanup occurs, the government may be called upon to clean up
the property. Such government involvement has proven to be extremely costly to
taxpayers. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
7. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (allowing deduction for soil remediation
and groundwater treatment costs); Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995)
(disallowing deduction for environmental impact studies and related legal fees);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-11-002 (Mar. 18, 1994) (disallowing deduction for asbestos
removal).
8. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35; Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13,
1995).
9. Plainfield-Union, 39 T.C. a t 338 (addressing the deductibility of costs
associated with cleaning and lining a water pipe with cement). The term
"restoration principlen of Plainfield-Union was first used by the Service in Tech.
Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995). The valuation test of Plainfield-Union has
also been referred to as the "before-and-after test."
The restoration principle analyzes whether expenditures increase the value of
property. The process involves "compar[ing] the status of the asset aRer the
expenditure with the status of that asset before the condition arose that
necessitated the expenditure." Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 (citing PlainfieldUnion, 39 T.C. a t 338). For a detailed analysis of the restoration principle, see
infra part 1II.A.
10. Previous letter rulings of the Service have discussed the restoration
principle of Plainfield-Union in connection with cleanup of environmentally
hazardous materials, but the Service had declined to give the principle much
weight. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-11-002 (Mar. 18, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-15-004
(Apr. 16, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-40-004 (Oct. 2, 1992).
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policy. Part I11 also summarizes the current law by analyzing
the most recent I.R.S. pronouncements and their application of
Plainfield-Union's restoration principle." Part IV addresses
the competing social policies of decreasing the national debt
and promoting voluntary cleanup of hazardous materials. Part
V concludes by proposing a two-step method for allowing a
current deduction of environmental cleanup costs that is in
harmony with the competing social policies.

11. STATUTORY
AND REGULATORY
AUTHORITY
In determining whether environmental cleanup costs are
deductible, a taxpayer must examine several sections of the
Internal Revenue Code that authorize or deny a business
deduction. The underlying issue is whether corporations will be
allowed a business deduction under I.R.C. 5 162,12 or,
alternatively, whether such costs must be capitalized under
I.R.C. 5 263 and depreciated over a substantial number of
years. l3

A. Section 162: Deduction for Ordinary and Necessary
Expenses
In order for environmental cleanup expenditures to be
deducted in the current tax year, they must be ordinary business expenses that qualify for a deduction under 8 162 of the
Internal Revenue Code.14 Section 162 allows a deduction for
"all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or bu~iness.'"~

11. Plainfield-Union, 39 T.C. at 338.
12. I.R.C. $ 162 (1994).
13. See I.R.C. $5 167-68, 263 (1994). Section 168(c)(l) states that the
applicable recovery period for nonresidential real property is 39 years. See infka
part 1I.C for an illustration of the financial benefit derived from receiving a
current deduction of an expenditure under $ 162 rather than capitalizing an
expenditure under $ 263 and depreciating that amount over 39 years. Since land is
not depreciable under $3 167-68, any costs that are capitalized to land may not be
recovered until the property is subsequently sold.
14. I.R.C. $8 161-162 (1994).
15. I.R.C. fi 162(a) (1994); see also Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689
(1966) (holding that the term "necessary" imposes "only the minimal requirement
that the expense be 'appropriate and helpful' for 'the development of the
[taxpayer's] business,'" (quoting Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933)));
Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S.488, 495 (1940) (To qualify as "ordinary" the expense
must relate to a transaction "of common or frequent occurrence in the type of
business involved.").
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Treasury Regulation section 1.162-1(a)16 provides the following examples of expenses that are considered "ordinary and
necessary expenditures directly connected with or pertaining to
the taxpayer's trade or business":17 cost of goods sold, management expenses, commissions, labor, supplies, incidental repairs,
operating expenses of automobiles used in a trade or business,
business traveling expenses while away fkom home, advertising, selling expenses, insurance premiums, and rent? If the
expenses are not necessary and ordinary, they must be capitalized and either depreciated under §§ 167 and 168 of the Code,
or added to the value of the real estate.lg
Environmental cleanup of hazardous materials generally
involves the restoration of contaminated land and structures to
an uncontaminated state. This procedure is similar to the repair of other business assets that have been damaged. Treasury
Regulation section 1.162-4 permits the cost of certain repairs to
be deducted in the current tax year under 5 162 if certain conditions have been met.20In order to qualify, a repair must satisfy all parts of the following four-pronged test: (1)the repair
must be "incidental," (2) the cost of the repair must not "materially add to the value of the property," (3) the cost of the repair must not "appreciably prolong [the useful] life" of the property, and (4) the purpose of the repair must be to keep the
property in an "ordinarily efficient operating c~ndition."~'
Environmental cleanup costs generally must satisfy the
four-pronged "incidental repair" test of Treasury Regulation
section 1.162-4in order to qualify for a current deduction under
5 162. However, if the environmental cleanup costs are part of
an ongoing plan of rehabilitation, Revenue Ruling 88-57 disallows a current deduction and requires the expenditures to be
~ a p i t a l i z e dA
. ~plan
~
of rehabilitation is evidenced by periodic
repairs that, standing alone, could qualify for a current deduction, but when viewed together constitute an integrated plan to
increase the useful life or value of an asset.23Considering the

16. Treas. Reg. $ 1.162-l(a) (as amended in 1993).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See I.R.C. $$ 167-168, 263 (1994).
20. Treas. Reg. $ 1.162-4 (1960).
21. Id.
22. Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36; see also Wehrli v. United States, 400
F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968).
23. See Rev. Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36; Wehrli, 400 F.2d at 690. For exam-
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enormous time and expense oRen involved in environmental
cleanup activities, related costs are difficult to label as "incidental repairs" not incurred as part of a general plan of rehabilitati~n.~~
Traditionally, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to
establish that an expenditure qualifies for a current deduction
under 5 1 6 2 . ~The
~ Service recently explained:
Section 161 of the Code clarifies the relationship between
deductions allowable under section 162 and capital expenditures under section 263. Section 161 provides that the deductions allowed in Part VI [of the Code], including section 162,
are subject to the exceptions set forth in Part M [of the Code],
including section 263. Thus, the capitalization rules of section
263 take precedence over the rules for deductions under section 1 6 2 . ~ ~

Consequently, if a taxpayer fails to carry her burden of proof
under 5 162, the capitalization rules of 5 263 will apply.27

B. Section 263: Capital Expenditures
Section 263 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that no
deduction is allowed for any costs associated with "permanent

ple, suppose a large university replaces a burned-out fluorescent light with a new
light that is guaranteed to have a longer life than the previous light. Viewed
alone, the replacing of a light is an incidental repair expense and receives a current deduction under § 162. However, if the university decides to replace all of its
old fluorescent lights with more efficient lights over an extended period of time,
the process is considered to be a single event for purposes of Revenue Ruling 8857, and the collective costs must be capitalized under
263. See generally Rev.
Rul. 88-57, 1988-2 C.B. 36.
24. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-15-004 (Apr. 16, 1993) (stating that the cleanup of
PCB contamination "constitutes a general plan of rehabilitation and restoration of
taxpayer's properties"). Despite Regulation
1.162-4 and Revenue Ruling 88-57,
Revenue Ruling 94-38 allowed a current deduction for soil remediation and ongoing
groundwater treatment costs. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. Revenue Ruling 9438 did not indicate whether soil remediation and groundwater treatment costs are
incidental repairs or part of a general plan of rehabilitation. The Service concluded
that the "soil remediation and ongoing groundwater treatment expenditures do not
result in improvements that increase the value of [taxpayer's] property because
[taxpayer] has merely restored its soil and groundwater to their approximate condition before they were contaminated by [taxpayer's] manufacturing operations." Id.
25. "[I]ncome tax deductions are 'a matter of legislative grace' and . . . the
taxpayer bears the 'burden of clearly showing the right to the claimed deduction. . . .'" Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995) (quoting INDOPCO, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 83 (1992)).
26. Id. (citing INDOPCO,503 U.S. a t 83.)
27. See I.R.C. 5 161 (1994).
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improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any
property or estate.''28 Treasury Regulation section 1.263(a)l(b) states that capital expenditures (1) "add to the value" of
the pr~perty;~(2) "substantially prolong the [property's] useful life,"30or (3) "adapt property to a new or different use."31
Although 5 263 is well defined and strictly applied, certain
statutory exceptions are granted for activities such as the "development of mines," "research and development expenditures,"
"soil and water conservation," "expenditures by farmers for
fertilizer," "expenditures for removal of architectural and transportation barriers to the handicapped and elderly," and up to
$17,500 for purchase of personal tangible property used in a
trade or business.32However, Congress has not yet granted an
exception for environmental cleanup costs.

C. Impact of Applying $ 162 Rather than $263
The effect of applying 9 162 rather than 5 263 can be
shown by the following illustration. Assume X Corporation has
voluntarily commenced cleanup of environmentally hazardous
materials located in a corporate warehouse for a total estimated cost of $1 million. X Corporation's marginal tax rate is 40%.
If all expenditures satisfy the four-prong test of Treasury Regulation section 1.162-4, the "incidental repairs" are fully deductible under $ 162. Consequently, the immediate tax deduction
reduces the overall cost from $1 million in before-tax dollars to
$600,000 in after-tax dollars." In contrast, if all cleanup costs
are treated as capital expenditures and the amount is depreciated over thirty-nine years," X Corporation's net cost is
$915,562.~~
Hence, X Corporation saves $315,562 ($915,562 28. Id. $ 263.
29. Treas. Reg. $ 1.263(a)-l(b)(as amended in 1994).
30. Id. Treasury Regulation 8 1.263(a)-2(a) explains that capital expenditures
create "property having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year." Treas.
Reg. $ 1.263(a)-2(a)(as amended in 1987).
31. Treas. Reg. 8 1.263(a)-l(b)(as amended in 1994).
32. I.R.C. 4 263(a)(l)(A)-(E),(G)(1994).
33. The tax savings are computed as follows: $1,000,000 x 40% tax rate =
$400,000. The net cost would be $1,000,000 - $400,000 = $600,000. These calculations assume a combined federal and state income tax rate of 40 percent.
The effect of the above calculation is that for each dollar spent on cleanup
costs, X Corporation's net cost is 60 cents-the other 40 cents is contributed by the
federal and state government in the form of an income tax deduction.
34. I.R.C. 4 168(c)(l) (1994) (requiring nonresidential real property to be depreciated over 39 years).
35. The overall tax benefit will be $84,438 realized over 39 years and com-
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$600,000) or 32 percent if the cleanup costs are deemed to be
deductible in the current tax year rather than depreciated over
39 years. As will be discussed in Part IV.B., a 32 percent reduction in cleanup costs will encourage many corporations to voluntarily commence cleanup activities; disallowing current deductions will, of course, have the opposite effect.
111. JUDICIALAND ADMINISTRATIVE
PRECEDENT
The Internal Revenue Service has struggled to interpret
the interplay of 55 162 and 263 regarding environmental cleanup costs. This Part summarizes the most significant cases and
I .R.S. pronouncements that directly impact the deductibility of
environmental cleanup costs. The most critical factor that has
evolved in obtaining a current deduction for cleanup costs under 5 162 is the application of the "restoration principle" developed by the Tax Court over thirty years ago in Plainfield-Union, Inc. v. p om missioner.^^

A. Plainfield-Union Water v. Commissioner
In 1962, the Tax Court in Plainfield-Union applied a before-and-after test3? to determine whether the cost of cleaning
and lining a water pipe with cement should be deducted or
capitalized. The Service argued that "the value of the pipe to
[the taxpayer] was materially increased by the expenditure and
The Tax Court
that it is, therefore, a capital expendit~re."~~
did not agree with this argument and pointed out that "any
properly performed repair adds value as compared with the
~ detersituation existing immediately prior to that r e ~ a i r . " In
mining whether a cost must be capitalized, "[tlhe proper test
would be whether the expenditure materially enhances the

puted as follows. Depreciation will be allowed at the rate of $25,641 per year
($1,000,000 divided by 39 years). Assuming a combined federal and state income
tax rate of 40%, the tax benefit will be $10,256 per year ($25,641 x 40%). The
present value of a $10,256 benefit over 39 years with an assumed interest rate of
12% is $84,438.
The effect of the above calculation is that for each dollar spent on cleanup
costs, X Corporation's net cost is 92 cents-the other 8 cents is contributed by the
federal and state government in the form of an income tax deduction.
36. 39 T.C. 333, 338 (1962).
37. The Service has subsequently referred to this test as the "restoration
principle." See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995).
38. Plainfield-Union, 39 T.C. at 338 (emphasis added).
39. Id.
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value, use, life expectancy, strength, or capacity as compared
with the status of the asset prior to the condition necessitating
~ ~applying the Plainfield-Union restorathe e ~ p e n d i t u r e . "In
tion principle to environmental cleanup situations, the issue is
whether the value of the property before the contamination is
equal to the value of the property after the contamination has
been removed. If the values are roughly equivalent, the cleanup
costs are deductible as a repair expense under § 162.~'
The restoration principle has not been uniformly applied
by the Service in determining the deductibility of environmental cleanup costs.42Additionally, the decision by the U.S. Su~ ~ been
preme Court in INDOPCO, Inc. u. C o m m i ~ s i o n e rhas
interpreted to require capitalization in many instances and
raises concerns over whether the restoration principle of
Plainfield-Union still applies.

B. INDOPCO v. Commissioner
INDOPCO u. C o m m i ~ s i o n e ris~ ~considered "the most authoritative, current pronouncement on the issue of capitalizat i ~ n . " ~The
' Supreme Court held that when two corporations
reorganize, one becoming a subsidiary of the other, the professional fees of the reorganization must be capitalized since they
provide significant future benefits to the corporation^.^^ Since
environmental cleanup costs will undoubtedly provide future

40. Id.
41. For example, assume a taxpayer purchases land for $100,000. The taxpayer commences manufacturing operations on the property and subsequently contaminates the soil. In year five, the land in its contaminated state is valued a t $50,000
while other similar properties without contamination remain valued a t $100,000.
After $60,000 is spent on soil remediation, the value of the land is once again
$100,000. The soil remediation causes the value of the land to double. Since the
value of the "repair" materially adds to the value of the property, a strict application of Treasury Regulation 5 1.162-4 causes the soil remediation costs to be
capitalized. Treas. Reg. 5 1.162-4 (as amended in 1960). However, under the
Plainfield-Union test, the value of the land before the contamination is equal to
the value of the land after the cleanup expenditures. Consequently, $60,000 is
deductible in the current year as an ordinary and necessary business expense. See
Plainfield-Union, 39 T.C. at 338; Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
42. Compare Rev. Rul. 94-38, 19941 C.B. 35 with Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-11-002
(Mar. 18, 1994); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-15-004 (Apr. 16, 1993); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-40-004
(Oct. 2, 1992).
43. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
44. 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
45. Larry Witner & Michael Lynch, Tax Consequences of Environmental
Clean-Up Costs: An Updated History, 23 REAL EST.L.J. 268, 270 (1995).
46. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. a t 87-89.
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benefits, a strict application of INDOPCO would apparently
require all cleanup costs to be capitalized. However, like most
broad tests, some exceptions apply.

1. Matching revenues with expenses for environmental cleanup costs a s a compelling reason for an exception to a strict
application of INDOPCO
Requiring environmental cleanup costs to be capitalized
under 5 263 offends the underlying policy of the Internal Revenue Code of matching expenses with the revenues those expenses produce.47 The Service has stated that "the Internal
Revenue Code generally endeavors to match expenses with the
revenues of the taxable period to which the expenses are properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purpose^.'"^ For example, if X Corporation spends $50,000 in 1996 to purchase a delivery truck
that is to be used for seven years in its business of selling
widgets, the entire purchase price should not be deducted in
1996. Instead, the cost of the truck should be capitalized and
depreciated over the useful life of the truck. Under this approach, the revenue produced by the delivery truck in one particular year is partially offset by the amount of the truck's
purchase price allocated to that year. Thus, matching income
with expenses more accurately portrays taxable income for a
particular year.49
Unlike the purchase of a truck, the costs associated with
remedial cleanup activities generally are attributable to past
income rather than future income. For example, if, in the production of widgets, X Corporation creates a hazardous by-product that is stockpiled on its property rather than properly disposed of, the net income for X Corporation is overstated. The
reason for the overstatement of income is that disposing of the
hazardous waste is an expense associated with the production
of the widgets already manufactured, but this expense has not
yet been recognized. Rather than capitalize subsequent expenditures for environmental cleanup and reduce future income, a
more accurate matching of revenues with expenses would require the costs to be deducted to offset current income.50Yet,
47. See id. at 84; Comm'r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 US. 1, 16 (1974).
48. Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19 (citing INDOPCO, 503 US. at 84; Idaho
Power, 418 US. at 16).
49. See id.
50. The most accurate method of matching revenues with expenses would be
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since the cleanup will benefit future periods of income,
INDOPCO's future benefits test would apparently require capitalization of the expenditures.
In developing an exception to INDOPCO for environmental
cleanup costs, two exceptions previously recognized by the Service are relevant, namely, severance payments and advertising
expenses.

2. An analogy between environmental cleanup costs and severance payments: an exception to a strict application of
INDOPCO
Severance payments are generally used in connection with
a business down-sizing in which employees are compensated for
early dismissal. ARer down-sizing, a business may be in a more
favorable position to minimize losses and/or maximize gains.
Consequently, severance benefits generally will provide future
benefits-thus making the expenditures subject to capitalization under the INDOPCO decision. Revenue Ruling 94-77 dealt
with whether INDOPCO affects the deductibility of severance
payments made by a taxpayer to its employee^.^' The Service
indicated:
[Allthough severance payments made by a taxpayer to its
employees in connection with a business down-sizing may
produce some future benefits, such as reducing operating
costs and increasing operating efficiencies, these payments
principally relate to previously rendered services of those
employees. Therefore, such severance payments are generally
deductible as business expenses under 5 162 and 8 1.162-

A similarity can be drawn between expenditures related to
environmental cleanup costs and severance benefits. Although
both types of expenditures may contribute to "reducing operatto allow the costs to be carried back to prior years to offset prior income. This
might occur if expenses exceed revenues in the current tax year and a net operating loss (NOL) results. I.R.C. 5 172 allows an NOL to offset income in "each of the
[three] taxable years preceding the taxable year of such loss." I.R.C.
5 172(b)(l)(A)(i)(1994).
51. Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19.
52. Id. Revenue Ruling 94-77 goes on to state that certain limitations still
apply. For example, "if severance payments that would otherwise be deductible
under section 162 are made to employees under a plan, method, or arrangement
deferring the receipt of compensation, these payments are deductible under section
404(a) subject to the limitations thereof." Id.
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ing costs and increasing operating efficiencies," both are also
attributable to previously incurred income and expenses. Thus
in order to "match expenses with the revenues of the taxable
~~
period to which the expenses are properly a t t r i b ~ t a b l e , "environmental cleanup expenditures, like severance benefits,
should be allowed a current deduction under 5 162 of the Internal Revenue Code.
3. An analogy between environmental cleanup costs and advertising expenses; an exception to a strict application of
INDOPCO
~
that "[tlhe INDOPCO
Revenue Ruling 9 2 - 8 0 ~indicates
decision does not affect the treatment of advertising costs under section 162(a) of the Code. These costs are generally deductible under that section even though advertising may have
some future effect on business activities, as in the case of instiAccording to Revenue Rultutional or goodwill ad~ertising."~~
ing 92-80, even though advertising expenditures will benefit
future periods, they are deductible under the theory that they
maintain corporate
Advertising, therefore, is considered an "incidental renair," deductible under Treasury Regulation section 1.162-4.57

53. Id.
54. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57.
55. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. $8 1.162-l(a) (as amended in 1993), 1.162-20(a)(2)
(as amended in 1969).
56. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57.
57. Treas. Reg. 8 1.162-4 (1960). To explore the concept that even expenditures for the most expensive advertising campaigns can be considered a current
deduction, one only needs to look to the extraordinary event known as the
Superbowl. For roughly four hours, viewers are intermittently blitzed with advertising campaigns that are tremendously costly. Kevin Goldman, Superbowl Ad Teams
Drop Ball, Calling Dull, Old Plays, WALLST. J. EuR., Feb. 1, 1995, a t 4 ("Sponsors paid on average $1 million for a 30-second spot" in Superbowl X K ) . For example, Coopers & Lybrand, a "Big Six" accounting firm, bucked the previous tradition of no national advertising in the accounting industry and spent millions of
dollars on a 30 second advertising spot in Superbowl XVII. Richard Greene &
Katherine Barrett, Auditing the Accounting Firms, FINANCIALWORLD,
Sept. 27,
1994, a t 30. In Superbowl XM, Nike spokesperson Stanley Craver (Dennis Hopper)
rambled for 90 seconds about his love for the game of football-a $3 million dollar
speech! Stanley Ads Strengthening Nike's Super Bowl Connection, ORLANDOSENTINEL, Jan. 29, 1995, a t H4. Can a current deduction for such extremely expensive
advertisements be justified along the reasoning that the expense is merely a n "incidental repair to corporate goodwill"? Although the Superbowl commercials undoubtedly influence corporate goodwill and thus should be expected to benefit future
periods, Revenue Ruling 92-80 creates a n exception to the INDOPCO decision and
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One important reason why a corporation would want to
voluntarily commence cleanup activities is to maintain corporate goodwill. Like advertising expenses, environmental
cleanup can be viewed as an "incidental repair'' used to maintain a corporate image, and therefore should be deductible
under Treasury Regulation section 1.162-4.
In summary, an exception to the future benefits test of
INDOPCO for environmental cleanup costs can be supported by
three theories: (1)matching revenues with expenses, (2) the
similarity between environmental cleanup costs and deductible
severance payments, and (3) the similarity between environmental cleanup costs and advertising.

C. Pronouncements of the Internal Revenue Service
The Internal Revenue Service has released a number of
pronouncements that have attempted to balance $8 162 and
263 of the Code with Plainfield-Union and INDOPCO. Unfortunately, the Service has not been consistent in its application of
the law concerning environmental cleanup costs. These inconsistencies are revealed by an analysis of the Service's rulings
concerning two significant environmental issues, asbestos
abatement, and soil remediation.

1. Asbestos abatement
PLR 9240004~~
is the first of two letter rulings from the
Service concerning asbestos abatement." This ruling addressed the deduction claimed by a taxpayer for the removal of
asbestos insulation. The taxpayer argued that the costs (1)
were "minor in relation to the total repair costs" and value of
the equipment, (2) did not add value to, prolong the life of, or
increase the efficiency of the equipment, and (3) merely restored the equipment to the value it had prior to the time the
taxpayer discovered the asbestos problem.60 The IRS determined that the value of the taxpayer's property had increased,

allows these expenditures to be currently deducted under !j 162.
58. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-40-004 (Oct. 2, 1992).
59. There are three accepted methods of asbestos abatement: (1) encapsulation, (2) removal, and (3) enclosure. 40 C.F.R. !j 763.83 (1994). Encapsulation involves the coating and sealing of walls, ceilings, pipes, or other structures. Id.
Removal involves the elimination of asbestos from the property. Id. Enclosure involves the construction of a barrier between the asbestos and the environment. Id.
60. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-40-004 (Od. 2, 1992).
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thus creating a permanent improvement to the property. Consequently, the expenditures would provide significant future
benefits and thus all cleanup costs should be ~apitalized.~'
Two years later, the Service, in PLR 9411002, ventured
into dangerous territory by holding that expenditures for temporary asbestos abatement may be deductible, but expenditures
. ~ ~this ruling,
for permanent abatement must be ~ a p i t a l i z e dIn
the taxpayer was required by its lender to remove all asbestoscontaining materials from its boiler house. Additionally, the
taxpayer was required to encapsulate damaged asbestos-containing pipe insulation in its w a r e h ~ u s e . ~ ~
The Service held that the removal of asbestos resulted in
capital expenditures since "the asbestos removal costs increased the value, use, and capacity of the taxpayer's facility."64TO support its position, the Service pointed out that the
asbestos-free building was much more valuable than the asbestos-contaminated building since the removal of asbestos (1)
"created better operating conditions," (2) made the property
"significantly more attractive to potential buyers," and (3) enabled the taxpayer to provide additional office space and a
garage free of the asbestos hazard? The Senrice distinguished Plainfield-Union by asserting that costs to remove
asbestos "permanently eliminated the defect," therefore the
expenditures were "not similar to incidental repair costs, but
must be capitalized as permanent improvements under section
263 of the Code?
For the temporary solution of asbestos encapsulation,6'
the Service concluded that "encapsulation of asbestos-containing materials . . . constitute incidental repair costs that neither
materially add to the value of [the] property nor appreciably
prolong its life."68 The consequence of this ruling is to treat a
temporary remedy as deductible under 5 162, but a permanent
remedy as adding value to the property, hence requiring capitalization of the expenditures under 5 263." Allowing deduo
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
nature).
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-11-002 (Mar. 18, 1994).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (asserting that the remedy in Plainfield-Union was only temporary in
See supra note 59 for a definition of encapsulation.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-11-002 (Mar. 18, 1994).
Id. PLR 9411002 does not indicate whether enclosure of asbestos is con-
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tions for temporary solutions while requiring capitalization of
permanent remedies is not sound tax policy. The tax savings
could entice some companies to opt for a deductible "quick fix7'
rather than a permanent remedy for the situation. Both PLR
9240004 and PLR 9411002 focus on the immediate increase of
value asbestos abatement will have on property and fail to give
significance to the restoration principle of Plainfield- Union.?'
If the Plainfield-Union restoration principle were applied
to both PLR 9411002 and PLR 9240004, the outcomes probably
would have been different.?' The deductibility of the removal
of asbestos would focus on the value of the asset after the removal compared with the value of the asset before the asbestos
was determined to be a health hazard.72 If the value of the
asset had increased, then the expenditures would be capitalized
under 5 263. If the value of the asset had not increased, the
costs would be deductible under 5 162, regardless of whether
the remedy was permanent or temporary.
2. Soil remediation

Both Revenue Ruling 94-38 and PLR 9315004 involve soil
remediation issues. In PLR 9315004,~~
the EPA required the
taxpayer to clean up contamination of soil and underground
water caused by the taxpayer dumping lubricants containing
PCB into surrounding earthen pits.?' To support a current
deduction under Q 162, the taxpayer asserted that the cleanup
simply restored the property to its value prior to contamination, thus the "incidental repair" was deductible under
Treasury Regulation section 1.162-4 by applying the restoration
principle of plainfield-Uni~n.'~
The taxpayer also argued that
the future benefits test of INDOPCO did not apply since the
cleanup costs related to past a ~ t i v i t i e s The
. ~ ~ IRS disagreed

sidered a temporary or permanent remedy.
70. Three months after PLR 9411002, the Service released Revenue Ruling
94-38, which adopted the Plainfield-Union restoration principle without discussion
of whether a remedy must be permanent or temporary.
71. Glenn R. Carrington, Tax Treatment of Environmental Clean-Up Costs, in
CREATIVETAX PLANNING FOR REAL ESTATE!t'RANSACTIONS, at 863, 870 (A.L.1.A.B.A. Course of Study (2967, 1994).
72. Id.
73. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-15-004 (Apr. 16, 1993).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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with the taxpayer's position and ruled that the costs were not
incidental under Treasury Regulation section 1.162-4since "the
cleanup operations . . . constitute a general plan of rehabilitation and restoration of taxpayer's proper tie^."^^ In addition,
the IRS minimized the importance of the Plainfield-Union test
and held that the "taxpayer's property will be more valuable in
its business after it is cleaned of PCB residues [than property
This proposition is clearly
that is] in need of remediati~n."~~
reversed in Revenue Ruling 94-38.
Unlike previous pronouncements, Revenue Ruling 94-38
fully embraces the restoration principle of Plainfield-Union."
Revenue Ruling 94-38involved a taxpayer who commenced a
three-year process of replacing contaminated soil with uncontaminated soil.80In addition, the taxpayer began construction
of groundwater treatment facilities including wells, pipes,
pumps, and other equipment." In a "burst of sanity,"82 the
Service reversed its position in PLR 9315004 and concluded
that soil remediation and groundwater treatment costs do not
(1)increase the value of the land, (2)prolong the useful life of
the land, or (3)adapt the land to a new or different use." In
adopting the restoration principle of Plainfield-Union, the Service stated:
Under the facts of this ruling, the appropriate test for determining whether the expenditures increase the value of property is to compare the status of the asset after the expenditure with the status of that asset before the condition arose
that necessitated the expenditure (i.e., before the land was
contaminated by X's hazardous waste)."

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Martin D. Ginsburg & Jack S. Levin, Corporate Mergers, Acquisitions and
Buyouts--Summary of the Basic Tax and Legal Considerations, in TAXSTRA~GIES
FOR CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS,
DISPOSITIONS,
SPIN-OFFS, JOINTVENTURESAND OTHER STRATEGIC

ALLIANCES, FINANCINGS,RBORGANIZATIONS, AND ~STRUCTURINGS

1994, at 7 (PLI Tax Law and Estate Planning Course Handbook Series No. 359,
1994).
83. Rev. Rul. 9438, 19941 C.B. 35; see Treas. Reg. 8 1.263(a)-l(b)(as amended in 1994).
84. Rev. Rul. 9438, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
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Finding that the value of the land had not increased under the
restoration principle, the Service concluded that "soil
remediation expenditures and ongoing groundwater treatment
expenditures . . . do not produce permanent improvements to
X's land within the scope of 8 263(a)(1) or otherwise provide
significant future benefit^."^' Noticeably absent from Revenue
Ruling 94-38 was a discussion of whether the three-year rehabilitation of the soil and groundwater constituted a general
plan of rehabilitation, or whether the expenditures were considered "incidental repairs?
Applying the elements of Treasury Regulation 5 1.263(a)l(b),87 the Service allowed a current deduction for soil
remediation costs and properly required capitalization of costs
associated with constructing assets to monitor possible future
on tam in at ion.^^ Although Revenue Ruling 94-38 allows a current deduction under § 162 for soil remediation and groundwater treatment costs, the ruling did not make it clear whether
its rationale applies to other cleanup activities.
3. Recent application of the restoration principle

The taxpayer in TAM 9541005~~
attempted to apply the
rationale of Revenue Ruling 94-38 to expenses associated with
contamination studies, legal fees, and consulting fees afker its
land was designated as a Superfund site under CERCLkgO
The taxpayer had for nearly two decades used an island as a
site "for the disposal of industrial waste such as agricultural
chemical wastes and coke oven by-products ."gl The taxpayer
had attempted to donate the property to the county to be used
as a recreational park,92 but when the county discovered the

85. Id.
86. Cf. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-15-004 (Apr. 16, 1993). In PLR 9315004, the expenditures to remove PCB contamination &om the soil were required by the Service to
be capitalized since they were "not repairs within the meaning of section 1.162-4 of
the Income Tax Regulations" and they "constitute[dl a general plan of rehabilitation." Id.
87. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
88. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
89. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995).
90. Id.; Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act, 42 U.S.C. 55 9601-9675 (1994); see also infra note 117 and accompanying text
(discussing the effectiveness of CERCLA).
91. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005.
92. The taxpayer "claimed a deduction under section 170 of the Code for its
contribution of the [lland to the County based on the fair market value of the
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contamination, it conveyed the land back to the taxpayer for
one dollar.
Although no cleanup of hazardous waste had yet occurred,
the taxpayer argued that the restoration principle allowed a
current deduction for contamination study costs, legal fees, and
consulting fees since the expenditures did "not result in improvements that increased the value of the property."g3 The
Service held that the restoration principle did not apply to this
case since the taxpayer had purchased the land from the county in a "contaminated c ~ n d i t i o n . "The
~ ~ restoration principle
"applies only if a taxpayer's environmental remediation expenditures restore the contaminated property to what was its uncontaminated condition at the time it was acquired by the taxpayer."g5Although a current deduction was not allowed in this
ruling, TAM 9541005 does indicate the Service's continuing
reliance on Plainfield- Union's restoration principle. The Service
outlined three requirements in order for the restoration principle of Plainfield-Union to apply.96The taxpayer must (1)"acquire the property in a clean condition," (2) "contaminate the
property in the course of its everyday business operations," and
(3) "incur costs to restore the property to its condition at the
time the taxpayer originally acquired the property."g7The first
requirement precludes application of the restoration principle
when contamination of property is attributable to a previous
owner. Absent reliance on the restoration principle, a taxpayer
is left to shoulder the burden of satisfjnng the four-prong test
of Treasury Regulation section 1.162-4.98

[lland," even though taxpayer was aware of the contamination of the land. Upon a
subsequent review of taxpayer's tax returns, an agreed adjustment was made that
"reduced the total allowable charitable contribution to the amount of the original
basis in the land." Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Treas. Reg. 5 1.162-4 (1960). The Service may only allow a current
deduction for prior contamination if the remedy is temporary. See Priv. Ltr. Rul.
94-11-002 (Mar. 18, 1994) (holding that costs associated with temporary asbestos
abatement are deductible, but costs associated with permanent removal of asbestos
must be capitalized). See infra note 132 and accompanying text for "innocent landowner" defense.
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4. Summary of the Service's position on the deductibility of
environmental cleanup costs

After reviewing the most recent pronouncements of the
Internal Revenue Service, a number of presumptions can be
drawn about the deductibility of environmental cleanup costs.
First, the future benefits test of INDOPCO will not be strictly
applied." Second, the restoration principle of Plainfield-Union1" will be applied, provided that the taxpayer (i) acquire
the property in a clean condition, (ii) contaminate the property
in the course of its everyday business operations, and (iii) incur
costs to restore the property to its condition a t the time the
taxpayer originally acquired the property.lo' Third, soil
remediation and groundwater treatment costs are deductible if
expenditures do not (i) increase the value of the property (using
the restoration principle), (ii) substantially prolong the useful
life of the property, or (iii) adapt the property to a new or different use.lo2 Fourth, a three-year soil remediation plan is
not considered a general plan of rehabilitation.lo3
What remains uncertain is whether deductibility of cleanup costs will extend to other cleanup activities such as underground storage tank removal,lo4 asbestos removal, or legal
fees incurred in cleanup activities. TAM 9541005 disallows a
current deduction for legal fees,''' but its broad interpretation of Revenue Ruling 94-38 suggests all environmental cleanup costs are eligible for a deduction under § 162 if the requirements of the restoration principle have been met.lo6 Such a
conclusion can be drawn by looking at the broad language used
in TAM 9541005. The phrase "environmental remediation expenditures"lo7 is used in the memorandum rather than "soil
remediation expenditures." The inference is that the type of

99. See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
100. 39 T.C. 333, 338 (1962).
101. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995).
102. See Treas. Reg. 8 1.263(a)-l(b) (as amended in 1994).
103. See Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
104. Leaking underground storage tanks represent a significant
hazard to the environment. It is estimated that between 350,000 and 400,000 underground storage tanks in the United States are leaking environmentally hazardous materials, with a total cleanup cost of $32 billion. Amy A. Ripepi, Environmental Remediation Liabilities: An Accountant's Perspective, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 395,
397 (1994).
105. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995).
106. See id.
107. Id.
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hazardous materials being cleaned up is not the determinative
factor in whether the costs may be deducted under 5 162. The
true test is whether the expenditures meet the restoration
principle set forth in lai infield- Union.log

IV. POLICYCONSIDERATIONS
OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CLEANUP
The cleanup of environmentally hazardous materials involves numerous conflicting social and tax policies. The national debt poses a tremendous restriction on viable options available to the government to clean up existing hazardous sites
itself, or to offer tax incentives to polluters to induce voluntary
cleanup.log Before proposing a method by which the I.R.S.
should determine whether cleanup costs are currently deductible, it is important to understand the competing policies underlying this issue.

A. National Debt
As the national debt continues its ascent to astronomical
new heights, reducing the deficit and the national debt is becoming an increasingly pressing issue. The Republican Contract With America attempted to address this issue by requiring a balanced budget by the year 2002."~ As evidenced in
November of 1995, The Republican Congress is even willing to
risk default on government obligations and permit the government to shut down in order to achieve this goal."' In order to
attain a balanced budget, a combination of two events must occur: (1)revenues must increase, and (2) spending must decrease. Contrary to this simple formula, environmental cleanup
expenditures may result in a decrease of tax revenues (if costs
are currently deducted) and an increase in government spending (if government intervention is expanded).

108. 39 T.C. at 338.
109. See infra part 1V.B.
110. Although the balanced budget amendment was defeated in the Senate in
March of 1995, the Republicans are still optimistic that a balanced budget will be
achieved by the year 2002. Robert J. Samuelson, Deliver Now, Pay Later, T H E
WASH. POST,April 12, 1995, at A25.
111. David Wessel & Jackie Calmes, Clinton, GOP Leaders Play the Waiting
Game To See Who Will Blink First in Budget Battle, WALLST. J., Nov. 13, 1995,
at A16.
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1. Decrease of tax revenues
If the before-and-after test of Plainfield-Union is applied to
the cleanup of all environmentally hazardous material, the
decrease in tax revenues could be enormous. If deductible
cleanup expenses amounted to $160 billion each year,ll2 the
lost tax revenue could be as high as $56 billion.ll3 Such a
large amount of lost tax revenue would significantly inhibit
Congress's ability to eliminate deficit spending and the five trillion dollar national debt.
2. Increase in government spending
The obligation to clean up environmentally hazardous
waste is not limited to corporate America. As reported in The
Washington Post in July of 1993, "The federal government has
been fouling its own nest and taxpayers will ultimately have to
pay tens of billions of dollars to clean it up."'l4 The article
quoted Rep. George Miller (D-Calif.), chairman of the Democratic staff of the House Natural Resources Committee as stating, "'As a result of inadequate laws and decades of neglect, the
American taxpayer will be saddled with billions of dollars in
cleanup costs. These costs currently do not appear on any budget ledger, yet they are genuine liabilities that the taxpayer
will one day in~ur."'"~ Thus, while Congress is grappling
with the method to reduce deficit spending, tens of billions of
dollars may be needed in the next decade alone to clean up
government-owned property.

112. Langer, supra note 2 a t 129.
113. $160,000,000 x 35% = $56,000,000 (assuming a corporate tax rate of 35%).
114. Tom Kenworthy, Land Cleanup In Billions Foreseen; 'Decades of Neglect'
Confiont Taxpayers, THE WMH. POST,July 9, 1993, a t A19.
115. Id. (quoting Rep. George Miller (D-Calif.)).
116. For example, both the Bush and Clinton administrations have attempted
to reduce defense spending by closing certain military bases across the nation. See
Robert S. Greenberger, Bush Suggests a Coup May Be Best Way To End Iraq's
Nuclear Arms Efforts, WALL ST. J., July 11, 1993, a t A2 (President Bush "announced that he had accepted the recommendations of a commission on military
base closings."); Clinton, With Reluctance, Approves Closing of Bases, WALLST. J.,
July 14, 1995, a t A4 ("President Clinton reluctantly approved a list of recommended military base closings . . . ."). However, by closing a base, the government must
face cleanup of waste left from decades of military activities.
Almost 100,000 acres of land controlled by the Interior Department's
Bureau of Land Management are heavily contaminated with unexploded
ordnance from military firing exercises that will be tremendously difficult
to remove. The problem is likely to get worse as BLM takes over bases
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Government spending for environmental cleanup costs is
also increasing under CERCLA and its "Superfund" sites
throughout the nation. 'I7
closed as part of the military's downsizing. For example, the agency may
take over 8,000 acres of firing range at Fort Ord, California, that could
cost hundreds of thousands of dollars per acre to make safe.
Kenworthy, supra note 114 (citing the report of the Democratic House Natural
Resources Committee).
An example of how costly a base closure may be is shown by the closing of
Jefferson Proving Ground (JPG) near Madison, Indiana. Since World War 11, JPG
had served as a major weapons testing facility for the Army, causing considerable
contamination to more than one hundred square miles of southeastern Indiana.
Richard A. Wegman & Harold G. Bailey, Jr., The Challenge of Cleaning Up MiliL.Q. 865, 870 (1994).
tary Wastes When U.S. Bases are Closed, 21 ECOLOGY
The Base Closure Commission originally estimated that closing the JPG
would cost only $30 million . . . [blut to remove all bombs and other
unexploded ordnance from the JPG, the Army would have to strip the
entire facility to a depth of thirty feet, using specially armored bulldozers
to do so; the Army estimates this task could cost $5 to $10 billion, and
other estimates suggest as high as $13 billion.
Id. Consequently, the cost for closing the base would be over 300 times more expensive than originally anticipated. See id.
117. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. 8 9607 (1994).
[CERCLAI was a reaction to public panic over Love Canal, the residential
development built near an old chemical dump in upstate New York.
There were supposedly about 500 other Love Canals. The EPA would
identify these "ticking time bombs," and force "responsible parties" to
clean them up pronto via suits and threats of civil penalties. The program was supposed to phase itself out five years and perhaps $1.6 billion
later.
Charlotte Allen, Environmental Folly: Superfund Toxic Problems Require More Than
a Quick Fix, BARRON'S,Sept. 12, 1994, at 62. CERCLA has not been looked upon
favorably as evidenced by the following comments:
[Tlhe authors of [CERCLA] attempted to harness the tort system to pay
for cleaning up the environment. Instead of collecting taxes to underwrite
all the cleanup, Congress chose to rely mainly on the liability system: the
filing of civil suits for tort damages against landowners, chemical companies and waste transporters.
That means treating them like wrongdoers, even though the overwhelming majority broke no federal, state or local laws in effect a t the
time of the dumping. Many not only had proper permits but were complying with state mandates.
[CERCLA] is thus a system of retroactive liability-a concept that is
unconstitutional in the criminal sector (we don't allow ex post facto laws)
and ought to be equally unconstitutional in the civil sector (it's taking
property without compensation).
Congress got away with this perversion of justice because big chemical
companies make convenient villains. The same cowboys-and-Indians mentality underlies the Clinton Administration's current reluctance to abolish
retroactive liability. "That would let Corporate America off the hook," a
horrified EPA official declared recently.
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There are now some 38,000 Superfimd sites nationwide. . . .
About 1,300 of them are on a "national priority list" of sites so
noxious that they presumably require immediate federal intervention. Estimates of total cleanup costs range from $300
billion to $1trillion, and the job is expected to take at least
30 years.llS

Although the federal government under CERCLA is to be
reimbursed by "potentially responsible parties" for any cleanup
expenditures incurred, the government has been unsuccessful
in large scale recoveries-$6.8 billion of the $7.3 billion expended through fiscal 1992 has not been reimb~rsed."~Consequently, EPA involvement in cleanup activities undoubtedly
will prove extremely costly to the federal government, thereby
senring as another catalyst to increase the national debt.

B. Encouraging Polluters to Voluntarily Clean Up
Hazardous Waste
Cleanup of Superfund sites has proven to be slow and
inefficient. In the 14 years of the EPA's Superfund existence,
the EPA has spent $9.1 billion in moving 13 million cubic yards
of environmental waste.l2' In comparison, Kennecott Copper
mine located southwest of Salt Lake City, Utah has moved 13
million cubic yards of environmental waste at a cost of $80
mi1li0n.l~~
From this comparison, it appears that the most
cost effective method of environmental cleanup occurs at the
corporate, rather than the government level. One reason for the
inefficiency at the government level is the enormous litigation
expenses incurred both by private parties and by the government. "Recent estimates of transaction costs [from litigation
and related expenses] have ranged from 30 percent to 70 percent of total cleanup costs."122Thus, according to these estimates, a substantial percent of the expenses associated with
cleanup under CERCLA may go to lawyers, rather then being

Id.
118. Allen, supra note 117, at 62.
119. Id.
120. Peter Samuel, Treasure House or Pollution Pit?, FORBES,Sept. 12, 1994,
at 54, 58.
121. Id.
122. Peter B. Prestley, The Future of Superfund: After the Rio Summit, Domestic Policy Won't be the Same, 79 Aug. A.B.A. J . 62, 62 (1993).
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~ ~ alleviate enormous
spent on actual cleanup a ~ t i v i t i e s . ' To
federal spending on Superfund sites, the federal government
should seek methods to encourage corporations to engage in
voluntary cleanup of environmental waste before costly EPA intervention is necessary. ks previously discussed, allowing a
deduction for cleanup costs could result in up to a thirty-two
percent reduction in cleanup expenditures for a corporation.lu Such a significant tax savings could serve as a pivotal
factor for a corporation in determining whether to proceed with
voluntary cleanup activities.
Allowing a current tax deduction for environmental cleanup expenditures represents a double-edged sword for the federal government, however. If current deductions are allowed
under 162, the government will lose tax revenue.125In contrast, without the incentive of current deductibility, corporations may not be willing or able to clean up hazardous waste.
This could eventually lead to the EPA declaring more
Superfund sites, thus causing governmental expenditures, and
the national debt, to increase.
If a current deduction is allowed for cleanup activities, the
lost revenue to the government should be considered an "investment" in the environmental stability of the United States.
The return on this "investment" may even prove to be economically profitable for the federal government considering that if a
culpable company does not clean up its own environmental
waste, the federal government may be obliged to do so. Consequently, allowing a current deduction now may prevent costly
government involvement in the future.
THE DEDUCTIBILITY
V. PROPOSEDMETHODOF DETERMINING
OF CLEANUP
COSTS

To balance the two social policies that appear to be in
direct conflict with one another-namely, decreasing the national debt and encouraging voluntary cleanup of hazardous
material~'~~-atwo-step test is proposed in order for environmental cleanup costs to be deducted under 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code. First, the guidelines of Revenue Ruling 94-38

s

123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
See supra part
See supra part
See supra part

1I.C.
1I.C.
IV.
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must be met, and second, the expenditures must be incurred in
a voluntary cleanup activity.

A. First Step: Satisfying the Guidelines of
Revenue Ruling 94-38
The first step of the proposal is to expand Revenue Ruling
apply to all environmental cleanup costs as long
9 4 - 3 ~ 'to~ ~
as the expenditures do not (1) increase the value of the property, (2) substantially prolong the useful life of the property, or
(3) adapt the property to a new or different use. In determining
whether these guidelines are met, the condition of the asset
after the contamination is removed is compared with the condition of the asset before the environmental contamination was
determined to be a health hazard.'" If this "restoration principle" is met, then all costs, including environmental impact
studies, attorney fees, and other professional fees, can be currently deducted under I.R.C. § 162. Although cleanup of environmentally hazardous materials will generally provide future
benefits, a strict application of INDOPCO'~~
will not be required and an exception is created, much like the exceptions for
severance benefits and advertising expenses.'"
If contamination is attributable to a prior owner, a current
deduction is permissible if the present owner paid an amount
that would represent the fair market value of the property had
the property been free and clear of all contamination (and the
present owner did not know or should not have known of the
contamination at the time of purchase). After hazardous materials have been removed, the fair market value of the property
will approximately equal what the purchaser paid for the property. Since no value has been added to the property, a deduction is allowed for the cleanup costs, assuming the other guidelines have also been met. A similar approach has been adopted
by Congress in assessing liability under CERCLA.13' According to the "innocent landowner defense," a nongovernment
entity that intentionally acquires property may escape
127. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
128. See Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 333, 338 (1962); Tech.
Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995).
129. INDOPCO, Inc., v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
130. See supra part III.B.2-3.
131. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. 55 9607, 9601(A)-(C) (1994); see also supra note 117 and accompanying
text for a discussion concerning the effectiveness of CERCLA.
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CERCLA liability if: (1)the entity can establish that the hazardous substances were placed a t the site before the acquisition
of the property, and (2) the entity exercised due diligence to
detect contamination of the property before the purchase.132
Consequently, CERCLA liability is avoided if the purchaser
was unaware of the contamination at the time of the purchase.
This "innocent landowner" should also be eligible for a current
deduction for environmental cleanup expenditures.
In contrast, if the present owner knew or should have
known about the existing contamination of the property at the
time of purchase, any subsequent cleanup expenditures should
be capitalized. In such a case, the purchase price is likely discounted to reflect the contingent liability of potential cleanup
costs. Consequently, expenditures for environmental cleanup
will increase the value of the land in the hands of the present
owner, and thus such costs should be capitalized.
The guidelines of the first step will serve as the mechanism to preserve the traditional notions of ordinary business
expenses of 162 and capital expenditures of 8 263.

B. Second Step: Voluntary Environmental Cleanup
In order to qualify for a current deduction, an entity must
engage in voluntary cleanup activities. The difficult part of the
second step is defining the meaning of 'boluntary." Consequently, it may be beneficial to address the purpose of the first requirement. As noted, the EPA appears to be relatively inefficient in cleanup activities as compared to the private sector.133Thus, the objective of the second step is to encourage
businesses to voluntarily commence cleanup activities to prevent intervention by the federal government. Although allowing
current deductions for potentially billions of dollars in cleanup

132. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(A)-(C); see also 4 JACKSONB. BATTLE& MAXINE I.
LIPELES,ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 317 (2d ed. 1993).
In light of the due diligence requirement, and the relatively advanced
techniques for detecting contamination, the innocent landowner defense is
not likely to protect many current purchasezs from future CERCLA liability. The defense has, however, encouraged many current purchasers to
conduct pre-acquisition environmental audits of the property to be acquired.
Id. The innocent landowner defense can be used "by current property owners who
acquired their CERCLA sites in the past, without knowing of the contamination,
and now seek to invoke the defense to avoid CERCLA liability." Id.
133. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
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activities will at first appear to be a step in the wrong direction
in eliminating the federal deficit, the deduction must be considered an investment in the environmental stability of the United
States-an investment that will pay dividends in the future by
forcing environmental cleanup costs into the more efficient
corporate sector, rather than leaving them in the more costly
governmental sector. Consequently, "voluntary" should be defined as "not requiring governmental intervention." Defined as
such, compliance with government regulations and directive
orders would be considered "voluntary," but expenditures for
cleanup of a Superfund site would not.134

VI. CONCLUSION
Encouraging voluntary environmental cleanup must be a
primary concern of the federal government and should be regarded as a long-term investment in America. considering the
complexities surrounding the national debt, Congress is in the
best position to implement an integrated plan that, first, serves
to encourage voluntary cleanup of environmental waste by
allowing a deduction under 9 162, and second, addresses the
impact that a current deduction may have on the national debt.
Some people may question whether the federal government can
afford to allow billions of dollars of environmental expenditures
to be currently deducted, but ultimately we must ask ourselves
whether the federal government can afford not to.
Steven G. Black

134. Under this approach, the taxpayer in Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 would
not be allowed a current deduction, even if the property had not been transferred
after the taxpayer had contaminated the land. Since the land was designated as a
Superfund site, an additional penalty is that the costs cannot be deducted under
$ 162. See Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Oct. 13, 1995).

